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Abstract: One of the major components of the Cloud 
Computing is “Security and Privacy”. These concerns 
about security and privacy directly address the 
trustworthy and reliability levels of a system. The 
researches and studies about security and privacy on 
cloud computing are continuing. The aim of this paper 
is to analyze the privacy and security requirements and 
highlight new tools and open research topics for cloud 
computing systems. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Cloud computing may have different meaning for 
different participants of the cloud. But, the common 
characteristics are on-demand scalability of highly 
available and reliable pooled computing resources, 
secure access to metered services from nearly 
anywhere and, displacement of data and services from 
inside to outside the organization. While aspects of 
these characteristics have been realized to a certain 
extent, cloud computing remains a work in progress. 
But, the security and privacy challenges persistent for 
the cloud computing and organizations or persons 
should take when outsourcing data, applications, and 
infrastructure to a cloud environment.  
To analyze the security and privacy issues, first the 
architecture and security risks should be defined hence 
well known. Therefore the article will start to provide 
some main concepts and architectural definitions of 
cloud computing in section 2.Then the article will 
continue by analyzing the security and privacy 
requirement in section 3. The section 4 includes the 
description of existent and new cryptographic tool to 
satisfy the specifically defined privacy requirements. 
Conclusion is presented as section 5.  
2. THE CLOUD DEFINITIONS AND ARCHITECTURE 
NIST defines cloud computing by describing five 
essential characteristics, three cloud service models, 
and four deployment models [1]. The essential 
characteristics are rapid elasticity, on demand self-
service, broad network access and resource pooling. 
The cloud has four different deployment models 
according to users’ needs. These are; public cloud, 
private cloud, hybrid cloud and community cloud [3]. 
The architecture of the software and hardware used 
to deliver cloud services can vary significantly among 
public cloud providers for any specific service model. 
The physical location of the infrastructure is 
determined by the cloud provider as is the design and 
implementation of the reliability, resource pooling, 
scalability, and other logic needed in the support 
framework. Applications are built on the programming 
interfaces of Internet-accessible services, which 
typically involve multiple cloud components 
communicating with each other over application 
programming interfaces [4]. 
2.1 Multi-Tenancy Structure 
Multi-tenancy defines the simplest form that 
implies use of same resources or applications by 
multiple entities (users or machines). The impact of 
this specification is the visibility of residual data or 
trace of operations by other entities. This specification 
of cloud service models requires the existence of 
policy-driven processing, segmentation, isolation, 
governance, service level separation and billing 
models. Multi-tenancy should be separately defined 
for each service model as: 
? Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS); delivers 
computer infrastructure by a platform 
virtualization environment.  
? Platform as a Service (PaaS); The capability 
provided to the consumer is to deploy onto the 
cloud infrastructure consumer-created or 
acquired applications created using 
programming languages and tools supported 
by the provider. The consumer does not 
manage or control the underlying cloud 
infrastructure including network, servers, 
operating systems, or storage, but has control 
over the deployed applications and possibly 
application hosting environment 
configurations. 
? Software as a Service (SaaS); also called as 
“on demand software”. In this model software 
and its associated data are kept centrally, 
generally on the internet based cloud. 
Generally, entities can access them by using a 
thin client and its web browser which is 
connected to the internet. 
There are important relationships and 
dependencies between cloud computing models and 
security risks. The platforms are built on as a stack on 
each other.  
Before to start analyzing of security and privacy 
problems of Cloud computing, some of the major 
players should also be defined with their roles and 
boundaries therein: 
? Cloud Provider: Person, organization or entity 
responsible for making a service available to 
service consumers. Cloud providers should 
protect the assured, proper, and consistent 
collection, processing, communication, use 
and disposition of personal information (PI) 
and personally identifiable information (PII) 
in the cloud [6]. A Cloud Provider’s activities 
can be described in five major areas as service 
deployment, service orchestration, cloud 
service management, security, and privacy. 
? Cloud Auditor: A party that can conduct 
independent assessment of cloud services, 
information system operations, performance 
and security of the cloud implementation. A 
cloud auditor can independently evaluate the 
services provided by a cloud provider in terms 
of security controls, privacy impact, 
performance, etc. The auditor may ensure that 
fixed content has not been modified and that 
the legal and business data archival 
requirements have been satisfied.  
3. ANALYZING CLOUD SECURITY RISKS AND 
REQUIREMENTS 
The information security means protecting 
information and information systems from 
unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, 
modification and/or destruction. To provide these 
requirements the necessary security functions are 
integrity, confidentiality and, availability. Information 
privacy is the assured, proper, and consistent 
collection, processing, communication, use and 
disposition of disposition of personal information (PI) 
and personally-identifiable information (PII) 
throughout its life cycle. And, some aspects of privacy 
are closely related to the aforementioned objectives of 
security. 
3.1 Security and Privacy Analysis of Cloud  
The sections below highlight five main privacy 
and security-related issues that are believed to have 
long-term significance for public cloud computing 
and, in many cases, for other cloud computing service 
models [4]. 
#1: Governance implies control and oversight by 
the organization over policies, procedures, and 
standards for application development and information 
technology service acquisition, as well as the design, 
implementation, testing, use, and monitoring of 
deployed or engaged services. With the wide 
availability of cloud computing services, lack of 
organizational controls over employees engaging such 
services arbitrarily can be a source of problems [5]. To 
solve it; audit mechanisms and tools should ensure 
organizational practices. 
#2: Compliance refers to an organizations’ 
responsibility to operate. Various types of security and 
privacy laws and regulations exist within different 
countries at the national, state, and local levels, 
making compliance a potentially complicated issue for 
cloud computing.  
? Data Location is one of the most common 
compliance issues facing an organization is 
data location [6, 7,8]. A characteristic of many 
cloud computing services is that data is stored 
redundantly in multiple physical locations and 
detailed information about the location of an 
organization’s data is unavailable or not 
disclosed to the service consumer. 
? Electronic Discovery; involves the 
identification, collection, processing, analysis, 
and production of Electronically Stored 
Information (ESI) in the discovery phase of 
litigation [9]. ESI includes not only electronic 
mail, attachments, and other data objects 
stored on a computer system or storage media, 
but also any associated metadata, such as 
dates of object creation or modification, and 
non-rendered file content. The cloud 
provider’s electronic discovery capabilities 
and processes must not compromise the 
privacy or security of the data and applications 
of the organization in satisfying the discovery 
obligations of other cloud consumers, and vice 
versa. 
#3: Trust- By the using of cloud computing, 
organizations lost their direct control over many 
aspects of security and privacy, and should have a 
high level of trust to the cloud provider. 
? Insider Access This can be done by cloud 
provider and additionally by sub constructors, 
and also potentially to other customers using 
the service, thereby increasing the risk. 
? Data Ownership: The organization’s 
ownership rights over the data must be firmly 
established in the service contract to enable a 
basis for trust and privacy of data. [4] Ideally, 
the cloud provider acquires no rights or 
licenses to use the organization’s data for its 
own purposes or due to security of data [10]. 
? Visibility: Continuous monitoring of 
information security requires maintaining 
ongoing awareness of security controls, 
vulnerabilities, and threats to support risk 
management decisions [11]. To fulfill the 
obligations of continuous monitoring, the 
organization is dependent on the cloud 
provider. Ideally, the consumer would have 
control over aspects of the means of visibility 
to accommodate its needs, such as the 
threshold for alerts and notifications, and the 
level of detail and schedule of reports [4]. 
? Ancillary Data: While the focus of attention 
in cloud computing is mainly on protecting 
application data, cloud providers also hold 
significant details about the accounts of cloud 
consumers that could be compromised and 
used in subsequent attacks. 
#4-Identity and Access Management: Data 
sensitivity and privacy of information have become 
increasingly an area of concern for organizations. 
Today, Identity Federation [4] allows the organization 
and cloud provider to trust and share digital identities 
and attributes across both domains, and to provide a 
means for single sign-on (SSO). Clear separation of 
the managed identities of the cloud consumer from 
those of the cloud provider must also be ensured to 
protect the consumer’s resources from provider-
authenticated entities and vice versa. Identity 
Federation can be accomplished by Security Assertion 
Markup Language (SAML) [13] and OpenID [14]. 
Their workflows involve a web user interacting 
through a browser with two web based service 
providers, one of which acts as the identity provider. A 
user requesting service S at service provider (SP) site 
is redirected to identity provider (IdP) with an 
authentication request. The request also includes a 
callback URL to be used by IdP to redirect the user 
back to SP. After authenticating the user as Q, IdP 
redirects user back to SP site with an authentication 
response containing a signed token asserting the 
identity Q. SP then validates the token and identifies 
the user as Q. Identification process continues on a 
secure SSL/TLS channels with server authentication. 
This generic workflow can be used to describe both 
OpenID SSO protocol as well the “SP initiated SSO” 
of SAML 2.0. 
? Authentication: A growing number of cloud 
providers support the SAML standard and use 
it to administer users and authenticate them 
before providing access to applications and 
data.  
? Access Control: SAML alone is not sufficient 
to provide cloud-based identity and access 
management services. The capability to adapt 
cloud consumer privileges and maintain 
control over access to resources is also 
needed. As part of identity management, 
standards like the eXtensible Access Control 
Markup Language (XACML) can be used by 
a cloud provider to control access to cloud 
resources. The XACML standard defines an 
XML-based language for stating policy and 
forming access control decisions. XACML 
focuses on the mechanism for arriving at 
authorization decisions, which complements 
SAML’s focus on the means for transferring 
authentication and authorization decisions 
between cooperating entities [15]. 
#5 Data Protection: Organizations have already 
been placing sensitive and regulated data into a public 
cloud, therefore, they must account the means by 
which access to the data is controlled and the data is 
kept secure. Similar concerns exist for data migrated 
within or between clouds. Data must be secured while 
at rest, in transit, and in use, and access to the data 
must be controlled. While access controls are one of 
the means to keep data away from unauthorized users; 
encryption is another. Access controls are typically 
identity-based, which makes authentication of the 
user’s identity an important issue in cloud computing. 
Lacking physical control over the storage of 
information, the encryption is the only way to ensure 
that it is truly protected.  
Standards for communications protocols and 
public key certificates allow data transfers to be 
protected using cryptography and can usually be 
implemented with equal effort in SaaS, PaaS, and IaaS 
environments [16]. Protecting data while in use is an 
emerging area of cryptography with little practical 
results to offer, leaving trust mechanisms as the main 
safeguard. 
The security of a system employing cryptography 
depends on the proper control of central keys and key 
management components. Currently, the responsibility 
for cryptographic key management falls mainly on the 
cloud consumer. Key generation and storage is usually 
performed outside the cloud using hardware security 
modules, which do not scale well to the cloud 
paradigm. NIST’s Cryptographic Key Management 
Project is identifying scalable and usable 
cryptographic key management and exchange 
strategies for use by governments, which could help to 
alleviate the problem eventually [2]. 
Before proceeding in cloud environments where 
the cloud provider provides facilities for key 
management, the organization must fully understand 
and weigh the risks involved in the processes defined 
by the cloud provider for the key management 
lifecycle [12]. Cryptographic operations performed in 
the cloud become part of the key management process 
and, therefore, should be managed and audited by the 
organization. 
The data sanitization practices that a cloud 
provider implements have obvious implications for 
security. Sanitization involves the expunging of data 
from storage media by overwriting, degaussing, or 
other means, or the destruction of the media itself, to 
prevent unauthorized disclosure of information. Data 
sanitization also applies to backup copies made for 
recovery and restoration of service and residual data 
remaining upon termination of service [4].  
4. CLOUD COMPUTING PRIVACY SOLUTION 
Homomorphic encryption is one of the most 
exciting new research topics in cryptography, which 
promises to make cloud computing perfectly secure. 
With it, a Web user would send encrypted data to a 
server in the cloud, which would process it without 
decrypting it and send it back a still-encrypted result. 
Suppose, for instance, that the task you've 
outsourced to the cloud is to search a huge encrypted 
database for the handful of records that match an 
encrypted search term. Homomorphic encryption 
ensures that the server has no idea what the search 
term is or which records match it. As a consequence, 
however, it has no choice but to send back information 
on every record in the database. The user's computer 
can decrypt that information to see which records 
matched and which didn't, but then it's assuming much 
of the computational burden that it was trying to 
offload to the cloud in the first place. 
For example, some specific data would like to be 
searched on an encrypted data base and no one should 
know that which data is questioned. Give 
Homomorphic encryption a chance such as like this: 
? You should have an authorized person to 
access the data base, therefore you should 
have correct keys to encrypt/decrypt the data. 
? Encrypt the searching data terms and upload 
them to search engine of cloud service 
provider-SP. 
? SP leaves them encrypted,  
? SP searches for them directly in the still-
encrypted database, and  
? Get the same encrypted results thus. 
If SP perform calculations directly on encrypted 
data, yet get the same results that consumer get from 
the unencrypted data, so both parties win enormously 
from a security and privacy point of view. 
In this process, SP doesn’t need any decryption 
keys, so the consumer no longer has to trust Cloud 
Providers as not to lose, not steal or not to sell 
customer data. In this solution, customer still has to 
trust cloud provider to give the correct results, but that 
is a completely different issue from privacy. This is 
related to correctness and completeness issue. The 
relevant references concerning Homomorphic 
encryption have been provided in References. 
5. CONCLUSION 
Threats to network and computing infrastructures 
continue to increase each year and have a tendency of 
becoming more sophisticated than ever. Having to 
share an infrastructure with unknown outside parties 
can be a major drawback for some applications and 
require a high level of assurance pertaining to the 
strength of the security mechanisms used for logical 
separation.  
The main solution; which outlines of security and 
privacy problems, can be summarized as follows: 
? The underlying architecture along with the 
technologies on each and every level of cloud 
should be understood well to create a 
sufficient solution for the problems defined 
above.  
? Trust, as one of the main participant, ensures 
that (i) the service arrangements have 
sufficient means to allow visibility into the 
security and privacy controls, (ii) processes 
employed by the cloud provider are the ones 
that were promised to be and, (iii) positive 
performance of the processes against time.  
? Solution systems should establish clear & 
mutually exclusive ownership rights over data.  
? Identity and Access Management should 
ensure secure authentication, authorization, 
and other identity and access management 
functions, and thus are suitable for the 
organization.  
? To satisfy Data Protection requirements; as 
mentioned in section 3 #5 and section 4 about 
new developments on cryptography, should be 
evaluated. But there are already open 
problems about data while at rest, in transit, 
and in use, and in sanitization of it.  
? Fully understand and weigh the risks involved 
in cryptographic key management with the 
facilities available in the cloud environment.  
 
Cryptography, key management, identity and 
access managements are the main tools for the security 
and privacy requirements of the cloud and, there are 
already many problems persistent at the moment.  
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